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One can understand only what one has created.
Giambattista Vico, 1725
In turning toward the craftsmen, the ingenious engineers who actually build engines and machines, we shall be able 
to clarify the strange notion of construction to which “constructivism” does not seem to be particularly faithful.
Bruno Latour, 2013
Resumo: Este artigo pretende mostrar que sem a influência de uma filosofia construtivista que eu denomino boa, 
representada principalmente por Bruno Latour, a elucidação das substâncias químicas teria sido virtualmente 
impossível. Sem a noção de materiais “artefatuais” cunhada por eles (artefatual não é o mesmo que artificial, uma 
palavra com conotações de engano ou falsidade que não se aplicam a artefatual; este neologismo procura evitar 
essas conotações e vem da palavra artefato), a Química Moderna seria impensável a partir dos metaparadigmas em 
uso no campo atual da história e da filosofia da ciência. A tese central que defendo aqui é a de que o construtivismo, 
tal como definido pelos antropológos da ciência, é uma maneira disfarçada de colocar a histórica filosofia materialista 
na trilha da discussão histórica e filosófica das ciências e tecnologias e que isso restaura o papel desempenhado 
pelos materiais usados pelos cientistas para que sejam exatamente o que são.
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Abstract: This paper aims to show that without the influence of a constructivist philosophy I call good, mainly 
represented by Bruno Latour, the ontological elucidation of the chemical substances would have been virtually 
impossible. Without the notion of artifactual materials given by them (artifactual is not the same as artificial, a 
word with connotations of deceit or falsehood that do not apply to artifactual; this neologism attempts to avoid 
these connotations, and comes from the word artifact), would be Modern Chemistry unthinkable from the 
metaparadigms in use in the present field of history and philosophy of science. The central thesis I defended here 
is that constructivism as defined by the anthropologists of science is a disguised way of sliding historical materialist 
philosophy into the mainline of philosophical and historical discussion of the sciences and technologies and that 
those restore the role played by the materials used by sciences to be exactly what they are.
Keywords: constructivism; artifactual materials; chemical substances.
1. INTRODUCTION1
Whenever we approach philosophical thinking, or a variety of philosophies (realism, relativism, 
constructivism, materialism2, conventionalism, instrumentalism, operationalism, and so forth), as we get 
closer to the field these philosophies multiplies themselves exponentially and we can find ourselves with 
more than one thousand, for instance, scientific realisms, as Carman argued in his doctoral dissertation 
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(Cf. CARMAN, 2008). We can indeed live among a plurality of ideas and even of philosophies, but there 
comes a time when specificity becomes important.  It is the moment of reflection, the moment when 
similarity and difference are of consequence.  It is the moment in which some applications of these ways 
or varieties of philosophies must serve to study a defined object, substance and/or process. 
My aim in this paper is to discuss the notion of materiality or rather of materials as artifactual materials. 
It is clear that not any philosophy will allow me to do this.  Realism would be useless, and so, alas, would 
be relativism, whereas operationalism in Chang’s (CHANG, 2009) version would seem inevitable, and 
so forth.
In fact, there is a philosophical way of thinking that since its inception around 1978 has facilitated 
thinking about materials and the materiality of objects and processes studied by science and technology 
which is basically what interests me here.  This philosophy is a very specific constructivism that on this 
occasion I will summarize, differentiate and determine once again (LEWOWICZ, 2003).  I will also try 
to show very briefly what is good about this constructivism for the history and philosophy of Chemistry 
and, reciprocally, what it contributes to the notion of chemical substance or chemical material. In the 
Introduction of Ursula Klein & E.C. Spary’s book we read: 
The dramatis personae of this book are materials such as metals, gunpowder, pigments, and foods. Materials 
and Expertise in Early Modern Europe take useful materials substances, “materials” as a route into mixed 
artisanal and learned practices, which contributed to artisanal innovation, the development of the 
consumer market, and the formation of the observational and experimental sciences of the early modern 
period.(KLEIN  & SPARY, 2010, p.1)
This is the definition of material I will use here, and at the same time I will consider that chemical 
substances qua chemical substances are the same as materials or artifactual materials.  And that the terms 
that refer us to these types of substances are all mass terms: “metal”, “gunpowder”, “pigment”, “meat extract”. 
In other works (LEWOWICZ, LOMBARDI, 2013a; 2013b) we have shown the difficult situation of 
the reference of mass terms.  The basic idea we defended was that chemical substances and materials 
are not individuals (but technical and epistemological individualizations -now I add) and therefore our 
historical and scientific languages have several, and in some cases severe difficulties to refer to the above-
mentioned materials.  These difficulties are clear although they may not be exhaustive.  For the problem 
of reference to be such and to make sense, it cannot be conceived as, curiously, Bloor does in several of his 
texts (BLOOR, 1999; 1999a; 2005) as a synonym of speaking about something. It is necessary to mention 
this problem here because Chemistry is a very genuine place to talk about scientific language and its 
problems. And we will find the tematization of this problem only in what I call good constructivism.
Moreover, I want to make it clear from the start my ontological position with regards to “material” 
or “chemical substance” or artifactual material. All of them exist, very few of them independently from 
our ways of thinking and working, others not at all.  In other words, the independence of materials or 
chemical substances are in themselves cases for ontological study.  They are not, and nor can they be real 
beforehand, unless realism be considered differently, and I am not sure I want to increase Carman’s list. 
The program of Organic Chemistry, for instance, is the production of new chemical substances thanks to 
the overwhelming productive ductility of carbon, all of them are clearly artifactual materials.  All these 
substances exist and become autonomous from the social, historic, technical and scientific contexts where 
they were produced, but they are clearly constructed and new with respect of nature.
This line of reasoning approaches the uselessness of the ontological theses of scientific realism when 
dealing with chemical substances.  Too many chemical substances exist but are not independent from 
their conditions of production or invention.  And what scientific realism posits is basically that the objects, 
substances and processes that science study are, in fact, existent and independent from scientific theories 
and conjectures, to speak only of the merely ontological theses of scientific realism.  In order to speak 
about its epistemological theses, we must address (again) the problem of the reference of scientific terms 
first, the existence of natural kinds secondly, and the non-arbitrary existence of artifactual kinds, thirdly. 
Roberto Torretti has rightly insisted that realism is a chosisme3 and that it should never have been called 
realism.   Indeed, there are few if any things in macrochemistry, the chemistry of human dimension; there 
are parts and pieces, few and many, non-countable objects.  If we wonder what is meat extract? The answer 
involves necessarily the historical conditions of its production, the way in which it is elaborated and the 
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kind of material produced: a very sticky substance of a dark brown used as a base to produce different 
dishes.  I can point to the object that contains it, but in no way can I point to the meat extract without this 
condition.  This is to say, the ostension function in the realist ways of referring does not work here. 
Apart from the fact that I do not find the philosophical taste of relativism pleasing, I have stated until 
now that chemical substances or artifactual materials become autonomous from their initial processes 
of production.  Actually, they manage at some point in their history to become independent from the 
model or models, theories or conceptual frameworks that took part in their production in such a way 
that the common sense believes that plutonium is a radioactive chemical substance extracted from nature, 
that is to say a natural substance, wholly forgetting the production process of this artifactual material 
which simultaneously “produced”  Madame Curie’s Nobel Prize and what in fact killed her, that is to say, 
completely avoiding  the history of chemical process that produced this wholly artifactual radioactive 
material which, however, was easily accommodated in the Periodic Table in use in the times of this great 
female scientist.  And it remained there.  Relativism demands that these things should not happen. On the 
contrary, it posits that each entity or process produced under a conceptual framework – and moreover, 
without a conceptual framework no entity or substance or process would have been produced—should 
not surpass conceptual change.  And, of course, that it should turn the problem of reference into a solution. 
Each entity, substance or process produced within the conceptual framework is already predefined in it, 
albeit not in its entirety.
2. WHAT CONSTRUCTIVISM IS NOT
Since the 80s, the expression “social constructivism” has been uttered with increasing reiteration and on 
such occasions just like one would repeat a pejorative, degrading and mainly accusatory label of a certain 
unknown philosophical crime.  In general, this status quaestionis is due to the gratuitously negative effect 
of Alan Sokal (SOKAL, 1997) and some of his scientist colleagues who tend to understand too little of 
philosophy and a little more of the anachronistic philosophies of science that survived until 1962.4
One of the wrongly dubbed social constructivists is the Strong Program in Sociology of Scientific 
Knowledge or the so-called Edinburgh School, or simply, the sociologists of science or bad constructivism, 
as I shall call them here. David Bloor, Barry Barnes, Steven Shapin, John Henry, are some of its numerous 
representatives.  In a post-Mertonian environment of laboratory studies the Strong Program is part and 
sometimes a synonym of a hybrid interdisciplinary field now known as Social Studies of Science and/
or Technology, which separates the old and the new sociology of science, even though its philosophical 
tenets coincide. They have the common assumption that science and technology, just as them are, works. 
And the basic purpose of both is to describe how science works and explain why it works that way. 
It must be clear that the purpose of these sociologies of science is not to analyse, criticise or challenge 
modern science and technology – be them as a value system or a world-view, or as a way of life and work.
In Knowledge and the Social Imagery (1976) David Bloor, the official voice of the Strong Program, 
remarks that sociology of science must not deal exclusively with its institutional character but also with 
its content and nature. This task used to be assigned to Philosophy of Science but today this has changed 
somehow. Unfortunately I cannot discuss this matter here. The general idea is that the so called sociologist 
of science (a further competitor of Philosophy of Science) must study the content and the nature of the 
sciences in the light of the scientific institutions where it is produced. This apparently social constructivist 
proposal of analysis of science will soon become disturbed when Bloor remarks that “the sociologist is 
concerned with knowledge, including scientific knowledge, purely as a natural phenomenon” (BLOOR, 
1976, p. 2; my emphasis). Instead of defining scientific knowledge as true belief (not materials, substances, 
objects, processes or artifacts), scientific knowledge will be for the sociologists of the Strong Program that 
which people consider knowledge. “In particular the sociologist will be concerned with beliefs which are 
taken for granted or institutionalized” (BLOOR, 1976, pp. 2-3).
However, the sociologist’s concern will be to locate those regularities and general principles or processes 
that seem to work well, and their goal will be the construction of theories that explain these regularities. 
If these theories satisfy the requirements of a maximum generality they will be applied both to false and 
to true beliefs and will offer the same kind of explanation for both.  Bloor’s example to illustrate what he 
is defending is the following: “the aim of physiology is to explain the organism in health and disease; the 
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aim of mechanics is to understand machines whish work and machines which fail” (BLOOR, 1976, p.3).
Likewise, for Bloor the sociologists look for theories that might explain the beliefs – again, not materials, 
objects or processes - that actually exist, regardless of how the researcher evaluates them.  So far, it seems 
obvious that sociologists of knowledge adopt a naturalistic thesis similar to Quine’s thesis (QUINE, 
1960) and hence they must adhere to the four principles and in this way embody, according to Bloor, the 
same values that are taken for granted in other sciences (BLOOR, p. 106).
Before enumerating the four principles of the Strong Program I must be allowed a brief digression, and 
reflect upon some of the consequences of what Bloor has said so far.  It is a naturalist and descriptivist 
sociology that does not intend to make value judgments on the contents and the nature of the sciences, 
but which will study what people think science is.  It emulates the natural sciences when it pretends or 
looks for the warrant of the assumed neutrality of the natural sciences, and to this end it must reduce 
sociology of science to a conventional and consensual description of the sciences: sciences are what 
scientists and the layman believe sciences are, hence substituting any normative feature of philosophy for 
an apparently unstoppable descriptivism.  The principles will now make what I am saying more evident:
a. Principle of causality: the sociologist of the Strong Program will deal with the conditions of beliefs, those beliefs 
emerging from the very content and nature of sciences.
b. Principle of impartiality: the sociologist will have to account for both the truth and the falseness of beliefs, of their 
rationality or irrationality, success or failure, etc.
c. Principle of Symmetry: the same kinds of causes must explain beliefs judged by others as true or false, etc.
d. Principle of Reflexivity: it should be possible on principle to apply these patterns of explanation to sociology 
itself.  This principle answers the need to look for general explanations.  An obvious requirement, since otherwise 
sociology would be a living refutation of its own methodology.
The so-called principle of reflexivity does not seem to have anything at all to do with the natural sciences. 
These do not require such a logical and methodological principle to avoid inconsistency, but it still appears 
in the four principles of the Strong Program in the sociology of scientific knowledge.  And needless to say 
it cannot be included in a set of theses that presuppose Quine’s naturalism (QUINE, 1960), according to 
which grosso modo there exists a continuity between the perceptual stimulus, the sciences and the philosophy. 
Consequently, it would also fall into descriptivism.  The principle of reflexivity on the contrary is entirely 
prescriptivist; it must be applied in order to the Program should not fall into contradiction with itself.
So far, what would be constructivist about the Strong Program in the sociology of scientific knowledge? 
Constructivism or the so called social constructivism, accepts Kant and Kuhn’s “constructivist” patterns 
(other, avant la lettre, with the same erroneus name). Namely: that  there is a substantial difference between 
“being constructed by” and “being constituted by”.  The construction of something is entirely contingent 
until what has been constructed is conventionally accepted by the community within which it was 
constructed. Conversely, the constitution or constitutivism, is essential.  A phenomenon is constituted 
by the forms of sensibility and the categories of understanding in kantian terms.  Moreover, something is 
constituted by the paradigm if, when the paradigm changes, those what moves across paradigms change 
worlds (LEWOWICZ, 2005). Until now the Strong Program is a kind of weak constitutivism, in no way a 
kind of constructivism, if we accept this distinction beyond conceiving that perception has a theoretical, 
or theoretical-practical touch – a thesis rather more relativistic than constructivist, or to make it more 
clear, a constitutivist touch – nothing clearly constructive is at work in the process of meta-knowledge 
that the sociologists of science produce.  
The so-called social constructivism seems to emerge not from those principles defined in the Strong 
Program but rather from the empirical case studies they research.  In essence, these empirical cases have 
to do with the analysis of scientific polemics that emerged throughout the history of science.  And after 
a detailed and thorough analysis - something that is always useful - it is always concluded, litany-wise, 
that scientific debates are won if one of the rivals manages to negotiate in better way which are true beliefs 
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and which are not.  Or what is the same, those who have more powerful social interests to impose: the 
confrontation of scientific beliefs is always empirically and referentially inscrutable (QUINE, 1969) - 
which always forces us to appeal to more or less powerful social conventions.  Now, are social conventions 
constructed?  Grosso modo it is very hard to deny this possibility.  Why or who is not known.  Neither 
is what for, and moreover, these conventions are always ready made at the moment of confronting a 
dissident colleague or group of colleagues, always handy as historical or social and theoretical - albeit 
not ontological - material. But conventions are in there origins contingent, as the good constructivism 
requires.
2.1. CONSTRUCTIVISM AND MATERIALISM
In  2003 I published a paper where I linked this good constructivism - also called in situ laboratory 
studies, or anthropology of science or ethnography of science, or reflexive anthropology - to an attempt  to 
establish the logic and the nature of these meta-scientific studies and their link with a materialism more 
modern than Boyle’s and other’s “materialisms”.  The merit of these studies does not lie exclusively in the 
evident fact that leads us directly to the practices of scientific laboratories, but which contributes - albeit 
insufficiently - to revealing the social nature of the sciences:  the attention these scholars of scientific 
knowledge pay to the manipulation of experimental processes and experimentation in general, and the 
path they open to  reach a clear knowledge, for example, of what Marx wanted with regards to scientific 
knowledge and in particular to those objects he called commodities: artifacts (as, for instance, fertilizers) 
produced in any process of human construction or in any process of human production and appropriation. 
In order to offer a well-organised exposition of what these scholars do theoretically I will have to make 
my way through much more traditional areas of history and philosophy of the sciences.  For some scholars 
of science and practicing scientists, the scientist is a dispassionate, objective, disinterested, rational person 
who has been educated for the natural and immediate encounter with the things that can be found in “the 
world”, and turn them into “terms that refer”.  This character is usually called a naive realist, to the point 
of turning this expression into a simple, fast and comfortable, but polite, insult.  Mary Hesse (HESSE, 
1980) remarked that this “scientist” believed in the existence of an external world that in principle could 
be explained exhaustively by means of scientific language.  The scientist can then capture the external 
objects of the world and lay them out in propositions that will be candidates to be considered true or false. 
In a somewhat idealist way, science presented itself as a linguistic system in which a true statement 
corresponded to the facts in such a way that, even if they were not observed they can be observable at 
some point in time.  These obscure objects were described in scientific theories and they could be inferred 
from their empirical bases.  In few words, it was possible to infer from the objects that could be observed 
those objects of the world outside our “weak” powers of observation.  
The naive realist is “cut off from the world” and above other poor mortals.  Here I will only underscore 
that the great problem of this vision of the scientist and of science itself is that it does not give us an idea or 
empirical image of either.  Empirical studies of science demand from the philosopher that he should leave 
his comfortable armchairs and allow scientific practice to be a mundane character, subject to cognitive 
and social interests.
The antecedents of these empirical studies of science can be traced back to Marx, Nietzsche, Durkheim, 
Spengler, Fleck, and the early Kuhn. Towards the end of 1970, the criticism of these conceptions gave a 
clear idea of the importance of studying the sciences empirically and generating an empirical philosophy 
of scientific practices.  
Therefore, I will speak here about the findings of in situ laboratory studies, or, what is the same, of the so called 
ethnographer and anthropologist of the sciences and the conclusion that their theoretical program allowed 
them to reach, such as the artifactual nature of the objects, substances, processes and artifacts of the sciences 
and technologies they were studying. Constructivsm links itself to the ontology of sciences and technologies.
If we set out to explore scientists’ laboratories with theoretical perspectives and with the instruments 
of ethnography, it will be of use to keep two things in mind: the anthropology of science tries to pay 
attention to those parts of scientific knowledge that were neglected, and in this sense it can be considered 
an empirical epistemology of the sciences.  Secondly, the ethnography of science is not necessarily a 
relativism, even though as Latour (1999) has repeatedly pointed out, it cannot but be a relationalism. 
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In other words, empirical studies of the sciences will always establish a link between a large number of 
scientific and technological aspects, among them the role of agent of the objects, substances, processes 
and artifacts of the sciences and technologies.
This good Constructivism pays special attention to the way in which scientific objects are produced 
and reproduced in the laboratory.  This constructivism can be characterized by means of five distinctive 
features:
1. The reality with which scientists work is of an artifactual nature.  This is to say, scientists manufactured 
the reality (again, objects, substances, processes) with which they work.  They do not and cannot see the 
bare reality directly.  They create conditions, chose materials and trust the theoretical and instrumental 
tools they inherit from other scientists and technologists to “observe and analyses” the objects they 
produced.
2. The activity of the laboratory is imbued by decisions.  Scientists constantly select courses of action, 
instruments, chemical compounds and so forth (HESSE, 1980, p. 32).  But moreover, previous choices 
reappear afterwards under the guise of rules, methods and interpretations.  In consequence, scientific 
objects are imbued by decisions - not of theories, but of practical acts - and they also impregnate new 
decisions. 
3. The third aspect of the production of the sciences and technologies is the transmutation of knowledge 
statements into facts. This is clearly illustrated, for instance, in statements like those discussed by Latour 
and Woolgar (1979). The advocates of scientific in situ studies posit that the laboratory changes statements 
throughout all 5 stages.
Type 1. Statements are “linguistically market conjectures” of an author.
Type 2. Statements.
Type 3. Statements are “qualified general assumptions” (“x is generally assumed to be...”)
Type 4. Statements are “incontrovertible”, facts still associated to an author (KUHN, 
1970)
Type 5. Statement stands as an unqualified “fact.”
Zenzen and Restivo also show how various drafts of a report on a set of experiments 
progressively incorporate statements that are more technical, more general, more conclusive, 
and less controversial. 
In brief, scientific rhetoric becomes progressively objectified as we move from shop talk to published papers. 
Scientific work involves transforming selections into non-selections, the subjective into the objective, and 
‘the fabricated’ into the ‘the found’. Scientists separate the ‘natural’ from the ‘social’ by (temporarily) ruling 
out certain selection and choosing others. (ZENZEN & RESTIVO, 1978, pp- 447-73)
4. The fourth aspect of the construction of the sciences and technologies is that social and cognitive 
factors are inextricably interconnected. The closer we are to the cognitive core of the sciences, the clearer 
its social nature will become. The weakest form of this thesis is, of course, the strong program, since it 
posits that the kind of social group that produces a science will affect the kind of science produced. And 
it is good to point out that within this group of sociologists of scientific knowledge Latour is nowhere to 
be found. But we do find for instance Lynch or Woolgar. 
5. Some sciences are self-referential. This is to say, scientists are committed to reproducing these conditions 
of construction of the sciences, particularly scientific practice.   Besides achieving or constructing their 
findings (facts or artifacts) they also produce the epistemological meanings of their findings. Technology, 
regretfully, lacks this point.
The constructivist underscores that the primacy of social practice is grounded on the presupposition 
that facts and artifacts, facts and truths and the philosophical reconstructions of scientific work, of their 
objects, etc., are, all of them, social achievements. Consequently the constructivism I present here is not 
subjectivist  (it does not emphasize psychological, individual, selfish or idiosyncratic aspects) nor is it 
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naturalistic, in the sense that it does not turn the sciences into natural phenomena accessible exclusively 
through the methods of the natural sciences (QUINE, 1960), nor is it relativist in the sense that it does 
not make of the construction of scientific and technological objects an entirely independent project from 
the external world; this constructivism can be considered an empirical epistemology. As Restivo put it:
Indexicality encompasses a variety of ideas that tie facts to social settings. The decisions (selections) 
scientists make are conditioned and constrained by social contexts, available resources, opportunities that 
present themselves (“opportunistic logic”), the circumstances and occasions of scientific work variations in 
the criteria used to select methods and materials, and the negotiations leading up to the identification of a 
scientific finding (Collins, R, 1989). Knowledge, according to the constructivist interpretation, is then the 
sum of these decisions, selections, and conditions. (RESTIVO, 1994, p. 129
3. SOME OBSERVATIONS
A number of additional conjectures have been formulated by ethnographers of science:
1. Metaphor does not play a key role in the origin of ideas in the laboratory; analogical transfer 
is much more important  (MILLS, 1963, pp. 229-30, 417)
2. The dependence on local opportunities makes laboratory work very much a tinkering 
exercise.
3. Interests and success (as opposed to “truth”) are key driving forces in scientific practice. The 
scientist and the technitian as well starts from a solution or an opportunity for success, and 
moves on from there with the objective of “making things work”. Perceived solutions push the 
research forward, in whatever direction opportunities for success may lie.  Thus, the logic of 
science rests on what scientists do with reality. 
4. There are no rationalities unique to science; just like everyday reasoning, scientific 
reasoning is practical, indexical, analogical, socially-situated, literary, and symbolic. In 
Latour’s words: 
Scientific fact is the product of average ordinary people and settings, linked to one another by no special 
norms or communications forms... What does distinguish scientists from other people is their reliance on 
inscription devices. The inscription devices modify the scale of the things scientists want to talk about; 
complex and unwieldy phenomena become transformed into “the inscription on a flat surface written in 
simple forms and letters. (LATOUR, 1979)
5. Scientific and technological work is a process of simplification in the presence of constraints; 
certain things that have been done are ignored, and certain things are just not done. 
6. Contingencies (social, material, and symbolic) are not merely “externalities”; they are 
“constitutive of” scientific facts. That is, scientific facts are actually “made up of,” or manufactured 
out of contingencies.
In general, I find it hard to see laboratory studies and some related constructivisms (Woolgar, Knorr-
Cetina, Pickering) as proposals that attempt to weaken or even undermine materialist theses; they seem 
to me instead roads that explore all the implications of the idea that a scientific fact is a social fact and an 
artifact, instead of being something one stumbles upon when one goes on a walk.  In other words, we need 
to develop ways of studying science and technology, in a critical way, and not always and insistently in a 
legitimising way – or, to follow Nietzsche:
We are not thinking frogs, nor objectifying and registering mechanisms with their innards removed: 
constantly, we have to give birth to our thoughts out of our pain and, like mothers, endow them with all 
we have of blood, heart, fire, pleasure, passion, agony, conscience, fate, and catastrophe (in ZENZEN & 
RESTIVO 1982, p.447).
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4. CONSTRUCTIVISM AND  ARTIFACTUAL MATERIALS
It would be fortunate to be able to conclude here that without the good constructivism I define in this 
paper as it appears in mainstream history and philosophy of science it would be impossible to deal with 
earthly aspects of Chemistry in a philosophical way.  But this would be simply false.  Instead, we can only 
point out that the influence of constructivism is such that it re-values artifactual materials as a necessary 
component of chemical research and at the same time it devalues the importance of theory as the main 
object of any epistemological reflection on the sciences, without these two posits the philosophical 
approach to Chemistry would have been extremely complex.  The language of Chemistry is firmly and 
in its greatest part made up by mass terms.  These terms have been received little attention not merely 
by linguistic philosophy of science but by philosophy of language in general. Only isolated and obscure 
cases can be enumerated, the case of Pelletier (PELLETIER, 1979) is beyond any doubt the most 
remarkable. To access Chemistry via experimentation is also difficult: chemical experimentation is not 
easily reproducible; it shares instead an innovative and emergent character that other sciences do not have 
in this level and degree; they seem to have it more on the level of theories. And finally the role of models in 
Chemistry is much more iconic than in other scientific disciplines. Models in Chemistry occupy the place 
of substances that are mixed both to produce a bond and to produce a new substance.
A model in Physics requires basically an interpretation of the axioms or theorems of the theory, which 
allows for a vision of the world. Chemistry works on a level with the “world”. There is no way to interpret 
the world for Chemistry in the absence of the material substances or artifactual materials it studies. In 
this sense, its relation with the so-called pre-Socratic naturalist philosophers is truly refreshing in the 
world of contemporary history and philosophy of the sciences:  the question Galileo rejected when he 
founded modern science, “what” is the world, and which he turned into “how” is the world, was dealt 
with always in connection to visual perception. Chemistry has asked for a much longer time: what is the 
world made of. Of water, answered Thales; of four elements replied Empedocles, and modern science, 
consistently, replies with a diversity that grows in geometric proportion by the constructive power of 
chemical experimentation, particularly organic chemistry, and because of the receptivity that every 
chemical substance has always enjoyed. It is obvious that Chemistry works with substances isolated 
from nature and it obviously work with artifactual materials. The property these substances share is 
precisely that they have been constructed or isolated in a laboratory. This feature, possibly trivial for 
chemists, is however very problematic for philosophers, particularly for those who detest materialism 
or who consider that materialism is a form of realism and not the other way around. This is to say that 
materialism implies accepting that there exists a logical (or necessary) connection between materialism 
and realism (or chosisme): the assumption of independence. We owe this logical mistake in the new 
(historical) materialism tradition to the duo Engels-Lenin5. In fact materialism is applied to  both what is 
independent and what is dependent on something human, the important feature for materialism is not 
the independence from that which is an object of study for science but instead its power of autonomization 
from the conditions under which a chemical substance, for instance, is produced in a laboratory.  And this can 
be abundantly observed in Chemistry.
But needless to say the philosopher and historian of Chemistry, a materialist (she could hardly not 
be one) must face like Diderot and Bachelard, or like Marx and Engels in their Thesis XI on Feuerbach, a 
much harder task: to turn scientific and technological practices into objects, etc., that can be worthy of 
philosophical analysis:
 […] we can see that the idea that there are two kinds of science - theoretical and practical - is nothing new. 
Indeed, Diderot explicitly favored empirical sciences that relied on the work of the hand over pure theory, 
condemning the construction of theoretical systems as ultimately fruitless. Nevertheless, in the course of 
the last two centuries, the rise of modern physics has promoted pure theory over other forms of science, 
making it natural to characterize those that rest at the level of practice as impure if not degenerate. Of course, 
considering chemistry as impure is ironic in light of the fact that one of the central goals, if not the major 
obsession of Chemistry, has been to purify substances. (BENSAUDE-VINCENT & SIMON, 2008, p.5) 
Finally, the central thesis I defended here is that constructivism as defined by the anthropologists of 
science is a disguised way of sliding historical materialist philosophy into the mainline of philosophical 
and historical discussion of the sciences and technologies and that those restore the role played by the 
materials used by sciences to be exactly what they are.
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On the other hand, the notion of chemical substance vindicates the priority of materials vis à vis 
individuals, and underscores the difficulty faced by historical and specialized languages to deal with 
materials that might not be countable unless they be separated in parts - with the usual risk of not making 
the sum of the parts coincide experimentally with the whole. A clear redemption of potency before act 
and of material before form (SCHUMMER, 2008).
 
NOTAS
1. For the purposes of this article, I must offer almost caricaturesque summaries of the philosophical positions I present.  In 
fact, with the exception of Chapter 2, I include this overview of some of the ways of philosophizing in history and philosophy 
of science and technology for methodological rather than epistemological reasons.
2. By materialism I understand, following the definition offered by Ajdukiewicz:  “historical materialism posits that matter, 
during its historical development, changed form, and became richer as it adopted qualities that are irreducible to the qualities 
it originally possessed.  Original inert matter, in which only chemical and physical processes would occur, gains in some of 
its parts, in which these processes acquired a high degree of complexity, a new quality, irreducible to the chemical-physical 
qualities, the quality we call life” (AJDUKIEWICZ, 2002pp 120-121).
3. “What Bachelard calls the substantialist or chosiste obstacle to science is rooted in man’s spontaneous tendency to conceive 
any process as the gradual manifestation of the attributes of one or more lasting and independent things taking part in it. It 
is conceivable that the stability and comparative hardness of the solid objects that primitives encounter as stumbling blocks, 
or wield as tools, or capture or collect as food, have contributed to entrench this tendency in human thinking, language and 
behavior. However, it is likely that its source lies deeper, that its very usefulness in the struggle for life gave it a hereditary 
advantage. Christian Aristotelianism, which assimilates the universe to an aggregate of substances, any one of which can be 
annihilated by God without altering the others, is, so to speak, the climax and the paragon of chosisme. This explains the dire 
straits to which churchmen educated in this philosophy have been reduced, since the 17th century, by the advent of modern 
science. I believe that the most extreme expression of this philosophical idea is contained in a famous passage by Leibniz: “Si 
j’étois capable de considerer distinctement tout ce qui m’arrive ou paroist a cette heure, j’y pourrois voir tout ce qui m’arrivera, ou 
qui me paroistra a tout jamais; ce qui ne manqueroit pas, et m’arriveroit tout de meme, quand tout ce qui est hors de moy seroit 
detruit, pourveu qu’il ne restat que Dieu et moy (Discours de métaphysique,§ 14; Leibniz, GP, 4: 440).” (TORRETTI, 2013 – free 
English translation provided by the author)
4. The year of publication of the first, and so far the only best seller of Philosophy of Science: The structure of scientific 
revolutions, of Thomas S. Kuhn.
5. I am only referring to the most classical philosophical texts of both authors:  Materialism and empirio-criticism in the case of 
Lenin and The dialectic of nature in the case of Engels. 
REFERENCES
AJDUKIEWICZ, K. 2002. Introducción a la filosofía. Epistemología y metafísica. (Introduction to 
Philosophy. Epistemology and Metaphysics). Cátedra, Madrid.
BENSAUDE- VINCENT, B. & SIMON, J. 2008. Chemistry : The Impure Science. Imperial College Press, 
Singapore.
BLOOR, D. 1976. Knolewdge and Social Imagery. Routledge & Paul Kegan, London.
BLOOR, D. 1999. “Anti- Latour” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, Vol. 30. No.1  pp. 81-112.
BLOOR, D. 1999a. “DISCUSSION. Replay to Bruno Latour”, Studies in History and Philosophy of 
Science. Vol. 30. No.1 pp. 131-139.
BLOOR, D. 2005. “Toward a Sociology of Epistemic Things”, Perspectives on Science, Vol 13, No. 3.
CARMAN. C. 2008. Se dice de muchas maneras al menos de 1111: una elucidación del término “realismo 
científico”. (Doctoral dissertation) 
CHANG, H. 2004. Inventing Temperature: Measurement and Scientific Progress. Oxford University Press, 
New York.
CHANG, H. 2009. “Operationalism” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
COLLINS,R. 1999. Toward a Theory of Intellectual Change: the Social causes of Philosophies. Science, 
Technology & Human Values, pp. 107-40.
doispontos:, Curitiba, São Carlos, volume 12, número 01, p. 197-206, abril de 2015
206
:
ECO, U. 1999. Kant and the Platypus: Essays on Language and Cognition. Harvest Books, New York
ENGELS, F. 1883 (1975; 2002). Dialectics of Nature. Karl Marx- Frederick Engels Collected Works.
HESSE, M. 1980. Revolutions and Reconstructions in Philosophy of Science. Indiana University Press, 
Bloomington.
U. KLEIN &  E.C. SPARY. 2010. Materials and Expertise in Early Modern Europe. Between Market and 
Laboratory. University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
KUHN, T. S. 1970. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago University Press, Chicago.
KHUN, T. S. 1979. Black Body Theory and the Quantum Discontinuity. Oxford University Press, New 
York.
LEIBNIZ, G. W. 1965.  Die philosophischen Schriften. Herausgegeben von C.J. Gerhardt. Hildesheim: 
Olms, 7 vols
LEWOWICZ, l. 2003. Materialism, Symmetry and Eliminativism in the Latest Latour. Social 
Epistemology, Vol. 17, No. 4, pp. 381-400.
LEWOWICZ, L. 2005. Del realtivismo lingüístico al relativismo ontológico  en el último Kuhn. FHCE, 
Montevideo.
LEWOWICZ, L. & LOMBARDI, O. 2013ª. “Stuff versus Individuals”. Foundations of Chemistry.  Vol. 15 
pp. 65-77.
LEWOWICZ, L. & LOMBARDI, O. 2013 b. Acerca de la categoría ontológica de la sustancia química. 
Galileo, v.: 48.
LATOUR, B. & WOOLGAR, S. 1979. Laboratory Life. Beverly Hills, Sage,  CA.
LATOUR, B. 1999. “DISCUSSION. For David Bloor….and Beyond: A Replay to David Bloor’s ‘Anti-
Latour’” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, Vol. 30, No. 1: pp. 113-129.
LATOUR, B. 2013. An Inquiry into Modes of Existence, an Anthropology of the Moderns. Cambridge, 
Mass: Harvard University Press.
LENIN, V. I. 1927. Materialism and Empirio-Criticism. Critical Notes Concerning Reactionary Philosophy. 
Collected Works from V. I. Lenin.
MILLS, C. W. 1963. Power, Politics and People. New York: Ballantine.
PELLETIER, F.J. 1979. Mass Terms: Some Philosophical Problems. Reidel: Dordrecht.
QUINE, W. V. & ULLIAN, J. S. 1978. The Web of Belief. New York: Mac Grow Inc.
QUINE, W.V. 1960. Word and Object. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press.
RESTIVO, S. 1994. Science, Society and Values. Betlehem: Lehigh University Press.
SCHUMMER, J. 2008. Matter versus Form, and Beyond. K. RUTHENBERG & J. VAN BRAKEL 
(eds.) Stuff. The Nature of Chemical Substances. KönigsHausen & Neumann. Würzburg, pp- 3-21.
A. SOKAL & J. BRICMONT. 1997. Imposturas intelectuales. Buenos Aires: Paidós.
TORRETTI, R. 2013. Estudios filosóficos 2009-2010. Santiago de Chile: Ediciones Universidad Diego 
Portales.
WOOLGAR, S. 1988. Science: The Very Idea. Ellis Horwood, London.
ZENZEN, M.  & RESTIVO, S. 1982. The Mysterious Morphology of Immiscible Liquids: A Study of 
Scientific Practice. Social Sciences Information, No. 21 pp. 447-73.
doispontos:, Curitiba, São Carlos, volume 12, número 01, p. 197-206, abril de 2015
